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Abstract 
We experimentally investigate the argument that the establishment and maintenance of 
an intergenerational transfer system is related to cross-generational monitoring. In our 
overlapping-generations experiment transfers are induced to be collectively efficient, but 
individually suboptimal. Varying the information conditions allows us to study the relation- 
ship between the level and development of voluntary transfers, on the one hand, and the 
possibility for cross-generational monitoring and rewarding and punishing, on the other 
hand. The experimental results give little support for the importance of monitoring, 
Nevertheless, a fairly efficient level of transfers is observed. The results suggest that the 
public good feature of the setting is more important than the bargaining feature, which 
would require intertemporal rewards and punishments. 0 1998 Elsevier Science B.V. All 
rights reserved. 
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1. Introduction 
Despite the growing financial strain caused by the ageing of the population, 
pay-as-you-go public pension systems enjoy wide public support. This raises the 
question of the determining factors of these transfer systems. It is often argued that 
one crucial factor is the perception by current generations of the support the 
system will receive from future generations. There is also no guarantee that 
today’s decisions will not be overturned tomorrow. This temporal credibility 
problem implies that decisions taken today must, in some way, be related to 
decisions taken in the future. In some sense, the system must be self-enforcing. In 
this paper, the presence and source of such self-enforcing mechanisms are studied 
in an experimental environment. 
One mechanism that could explain a stable public pension system is the 
presence of a voluntary ‘social contract’ between successive generations. Even if 
generations are not altruistic towards other generations, (implicit) social contracts 
with positive intergenerational transfers can be supported as a Nash-equilibrium. ’ 
Ingredients of such a contract are, first, the obligation to provide the elderly with a 
transfer equal to some prescribed level if they have adhered to the contract 
themselves, and, second, a punishment rule if the elderly broke the social contract. 
One problem with this approach is that there often are many alternative social 
contracts which could lead to a stable pension system. Which of these contracts 
will occur depends upon the expectations held by successive generations and the 
way they solve any coordination problems. 
A less sophisticated but related explanation is that successive generations ‘build 
up confidence’ in the maintenance of the system by looking at the past perfor- 
mance of the system. It can be shown that public transfers can converge to socially 
efficient levels, if the confidence in the system grows when successive generations 
keep following the scheme. 2 
Under both the social contract approach and the confidence-building approach, 
the relation between past and present decisions plays a central role. By monitoring 
the behaviour of past decision makers, current decision makers decide whether to 
support a transfer system. In reality, preferences and decisions are aggregated in a 
complex (political) process. Therefore, in empirical data on the development of 
pension schemes, disentangling any of the above mentioned factors will be 
difficult, if not impossible. 
As in many areas of economics, a more detailed inspection of the determining 
factors of decision-making is possible (only) in a controlled experimental environ- 
ment. In the present paper we study individual decisions about transfers in an 
experimental overlapping-generations (OLG) setting. We examine the develop- 
’ See Sjoblom (1985) and Kotlikoff et al. (1988) for a related model. See Veal1 (1986). for a model 
that demonstrates that altruism in itself is not sufficient to engender intergenerational transfers. 
2 See Verbon (1987) and Van Dalen and Van Praag (1992) for this approach. 
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ment of transfers in a setting where player (generation) P, decides on a transfer to 
player P,_ 1. In turn, player P,+ I decides on a transfer to player P,; then player 
P (+ 2 decides on a transfer to player P,+ ,, and so on. A voluntary transfer system 
is induced to be collectively efficient. Intergenerational transfers allow for the 
smoothing of consumption over time. On the other hand, transfers are individually 
irrational because the direct private benefits of giving a transfer are negative. 
The central question of our investigation is whether allowing the present 
generation to monitor and to react on the transfers of the previous generation(s) 
facilitates the development and stability of a voluntary system of transfers. To that 
purpose we employ two information treatments. In one treatment, player-genera- 
tions are supplied with information about the transfer levels of previous genera- 
tions. In the second (control) treatment they are not supplied with this information. 
So, if monitoring and the possibility of rewards and punishments across genera- 
tions adds to the development and stability of a voluntary transfer system, then this 
should show up as a difference between the two treatments. 
Our study is related to experiments on the voluntary provision of public goods. 
Also in the public-goods experiments there is a tension between collective and 
individual rationality. The typical finding there is that contributions are clearly 
bounded away from the individually rational level of zero, but fall short of the 
collectively efficient contribution level (see Ledyard, 1995, for a survey of the 
literature). Public-good experiments, however, lack the intertemporal structure that 
is characteristic of decision making on intergenerational transfers. 
Our study is also related to experiments on the role of altruism and reciprocity 
in bilateral bargaining. In gift exchange experiments, for example, the responder’s 
return on the proposer’s gift is often found to be increasing in the size of the gift 
(Fehr et al., 1993; Berg et al., 1995). Similarly, in ultimatum bargaining experi- 
ments the probability that a proposal is accepted by a responder is increasing in 
the share of the cake the proposer is prepared to give to the responder (Giith and 
Tie&, 1990). So, reciprocity can be observed in a bilateral relationship if both 
sides have some power. Experimental evidence suggests, furthermore, that the 
latter condition is not only sufficient but also necessary for gift giving to occur. If 
the receiving side of the relationship has no power at all, the proposer’s gift 
decreases drastically. For example, in Forsythe et al. (1994), the modal proposal is 
about 50% of the $5 cake to a receiving player with veto power but less than 10% 
to a receiver with no reciprocal power (see also Giith and Van Damme, 1994). The 
experimental games studied in the present paper are, in some sense, in between the 
dictator games with no reciprocal power and the ultimatum or gift exchange games 
with full reciprocal power. Rewards and punishments may be anticipated by the 
sender of a gift, but they (if at all) are not supplied by the receiver of the gift but 
by a third party, namely the next generation-player. 
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section presents the underlying model 
and the two main questions of the experiment. Section 3 describes the experimen- 
tal design. Results are presented in Section 4. Because we wanted to examine the 
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robustness of the results, we have run two additional series of experiments. 
Section 5 briefly discusses the results of these additional sessions. Finally, Section 
6 contains a concluding discussion. 
2. An OLG model with transfers 
The model that forms the basis for our experiments is a simple two overlap- 
ping-generations (OLG) model in which each generation consists of one player. 
Each player lives for two periods. In the first period (when young), a player is 
endowed with a transferable endowment of 7 and a non-transferable endowment of 
2. In the second period (when old), a player only receives a non-transferable 
endowment of 1. The young player in period t decides about the part T, of the 
transferable endowment of 7 he wishes to transfer to the current old player, 
0 i T, 2 7. The remaining endowment is used for ‘consumption’. So, first period 
consumption C,, of player P, (when young) is given by: 
c,, = 9 - T,. (1) 
Second period consumption C?, of player P, (when old) is given by: 
cII= 1 +T,+, (2) 
where T,, , is the transfer player P, receives from player P, +, in the second 
period of his life. Total utility U, of player P,, is given by the following utility OI 
pay-off function (t 2 1): ’ 
U,=C,,xC2,=(9-Z’,)(l+T,,,). (3) 
The form of the pay-off function reflects the fact that consumption in both the first 
(young) and the second (old) period of one’s life matters. The multiplicative form. 
in addition, implies that it is optimal to smooth consumption over both periods. 
First consider the decision problem of a (non-altruistic) player P,. This player 
faces the following problem: 
max (9-T,)(l+T,‘,,) 
0 5 T, 5 7 
where T,: , is player P,‘s expectation about the next player’s transfer. It is easily 
seen that if P, expects T,, , to be unrelated to T,, he will choose to transfer r, = 0. 
3 Of course, in the experiment the sequence of players has to be started and stopped. The first player 
in the sequence, I’,,, only plays the role of the receiving (old) player. The final player in the sequence. 
P, in the experiments, only plays the role of the transferring (young) player. No experimental standard 
has been developed yet on how to deal with this. In the experiment we chose to set player P(,‘s first 
period consumption (when young) equal to the basic endowment: C,,, = 2. Player P,‘s received 
transfer (when old) was set equal to the average transfer to all previous receivers (rounded up). To a 
large extent this starting and stopping rule is an arbitrary matter. To check whether our results are 
affected by this choice, we ran an additional design (discussed in Section 5) which mitigates the impact 
of this starting and stopping rule. 
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If all players choose a transfer of 0, then the pay-off to each player will be 9 (and 
2 for P,; see footnote 3). In a finite sequence of players (as we will have in our 
experiment) the unique Nash-equilibrium is for all players to transfer zero. 
The players forego considerable pay-off opportunities when all choose a 
transfer of zero. From Eq. (3) it follows that if all players choose a transfer of 4, 
they would all receive a pay-off of 25 (10 for player Pa>. The question is: How 
could such a transfer come about? It is easily seen that a necessary condition for 
any positive transfers to be given by a non-altruistic player is that some relation 
exists between present and (expected) future transfers. For example, if strict 
‘following behaviour’ is anticipated by P,, that is, T,“+ , = T,, then the transfer that 
maximizes Pt’s expected pay-offs can be calculated to be equal to T, = 4. 4 
Obviously, player P, cannot control the reaction T,, 1 of player P,+ 1 to his own 
transfer T,. It depends on the future players’ willingness to cooperate whether 
positive transfers can be established. 
Non-altruistic players will only be willing to give positive transfers if they have 
some confidence that positive transfers will be rewarded by the next player. In 
other words, the players should expect some relationship to exist between past, 
current, and future transfers. A specification in line with this idea, suggested by 
Van Dalen and Van Praag (1992), is the following: 
T” t+ 1 = T,+ a(T,- T,_,), a> -1, (51 
where o denotes the degree of confidence or the support expected by the next 
generation. The current generation is expecting to be rewarded for its own transfer, 
and, in addition, it expects to receive a premium for increasing the transfer level 
above the level provided by the previous generation. 5 
Another, more strategic approach which could explain positive transfers is the 
social contract model, mentioned in the introduction. In an infinite sequence of 
overlapping generations, positive transfers can be supported as a Nash equilibrium. 
In the experiment we will have a finite sequence, however. Nevertheless, in 
finitely repeated games, experimental subjects are sometimes seen (to learn) to 
employ ‘trigger-like’ strategies to support outcomes that are non-Nash in the stage 
game (see, e.g., Selten and Stoecker, 1986; Camerer and Weigelt, 1988). Simi- 
larly, if such trigger strategies are (learned to be) employed and anticipated in our 
finite OLG game, they might lead to positive transfer levels. Central to such 
strategies is that generations are punished for deviating from the implicitly agreed 
4 It can be calculated that (due to our starting and stopping rule) T = 4$ is the stationary level of 
transfers that maximizes joint pay-offs of all players, including Pa. In the experiment we restrict 
transfers to integer values. Hence, also from this respect, T = 4 seems to be a useful benchmark. 
’ A problem with this specification is that it is not consistent with expected pay-off maximization. It 
is easily checked that maximization of Eq. (4) subject to Eq. (5) leads to a solution for Tr which is 
usually inconsistent with the hypothesized relation in Eq. (5). In other words, if players’ expectations 
about the transfers of others are in accordance with Eq. (S), their own transfers will not be in 
accordance with Eq. (5) under expected pay-off maximization. 
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upon transfer level, unless this deviation was in order to punish a previous 
deviating generation. In other words, deviators and non-punishers are punished, 
but punishers are not. Clearly, if such a strategy is anticipated, then following the 
implicit contract would be optimal (for all but the last generation). 
The central question now is whether players are actually willing and able to 
sustain positive transfer levels in this setting. Of course, this will depend on the 
motivations and expectations of the players. In this paper we examine, in 
particular, whether the possibility of monitoring previous generations facilitates 
the realization of collectively beneficial positive transfers levels. To that purpose 
we employ two information treatments: treatment I (information) and treatment N 
(no information). In treatment I, each player generation P, is provided with 
information about the transfers of previous generations (T,, , T,. ,> in the 
sequence. In (control) treatment N, players are not provided with this information. 
This allows us to test the theoretical supposition that the support for collective 
(transfer) schemes can be explained by an implicit social contract, the successive 
build up of confidence, or any other norm or rule which requires cross-genera- 
tional monitoring. The main two questions of our inquiry are then: 
Ql. Does the possibility of monitoring the transfer levels of previous generations 
facilitate the occurrence of positive transfers? 
Q2. Do we observe a systematic relation between the transfer level of the present 
generation and that of the next generation(s) in information treatment I? 
The two questions are, of course, interrelated. An affirmative answer to question 
Ql requires an affirmative answer to question Q2 almost by necessity. If monitor- 
ing facilitates the occurrence of positive transfers, then this facilitating role should 
come about through some (positive) relation between present and future transfers. 
The reverse, however, need not necessarily hold. If we were to find a 
systematic positive relation between present and future transfers, then the average 
level of transfers might still be lower in treatment I than in treatment N. The 
reason for this is that with a positive relation between Y’, and T,, , low transfers in 
period t will be followed by low transfers in period t + 1 (and t + 2, t + 3, etc.). 
So, if in the initial period or in some later period a low level of transfers is 
observed, this might lead to a low level of transfers after that period. Such a chain 
of low transfers owing to punishments can occur in information treatment I but not 
in information treatment N. However, if such an outcome were to be observed - 
that is, an affirmative answer to Q2 and a negative answer to Ql - we would at 
least expect the (low) level of transfers in treatment I to be more ‘stable’ than in 
treatment N. Therefore, in discussing the results, we will not only compare the 
average levels of transfers across the two treatments, but also the variability of the 
transfers. 
Three final remarks concerning our setup must be made. The first remark 
concerns the motivation of the experimental subjects. We are interested to see 
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whether individuals achieve higher levels of cooperation when there is a possibil- 
ity to monitor the adherence to certain standards or rules of conduct. However, in 
the game-theoretical benchmark (with zero transfers) the players are assumed to be 
non-altruistic income maximizers, not inhibited by any social norms or rules. 
“Note, however, that to design an experiment that allows one to contrast a more 
complex theory with a theory based on simple income maximization, it is 
nevertheless necessary to know what the income maximization theory predicts, so 
that it is necessary to control for the predictions of the simpler theory even when 
more complex theories of behaviour are being examined” (Roth, 1995a, p. 80). 
Therefore, we follow conventional conduct and try to induce such purely non-al- 
truistic individual motivations on the experimental subjects. 
Nevertheless, as is well recognized “experiments suggest that bargainers may 
be concerned with more than their own pay-offs in evaluating outcomes. On a 
purely methodological level, this illustrates how difficult it is to gain complete 
control over the experimental environment” (Roth, 1995b, p. 328; see also 
Ledyard, 1995, p. 169). Hence, if experimental data are not in line with theory it is 
possible that the preferences assumed in the theory do not correspond to those of 
the experimental subjects.This issue of (internal) validity is most often raised if the 
experimental data do not correspond to the predictions of a theory. 6 Therefore, 
we do not simply compare the experimental results to theoretical predictions, but 
base our main conclusions on a comparison of the two information treatments. 
“[T]he strongest conclusions from an experimental study come from within 
experiment comparisons, which report the effect of a change of a single variable, 
while holding others constant” (Roth, 1988, p. 1023, emphasis in the original). 
Second, it seems important to allow the subjects to learn and understand the 
structure of the OLG game. In our basic design we choose to have several 
repetitions (15) of an OLG game with a restricted sequence of generations (8) and 
no ‘reincarnation’ (like Cadsby and Frank, 1990), rather than one OLG game with 
a long sequence of (say, 120) generations and reincarnation (like Marimon and 
Sunder, 1993). Consequently, the backward-induction argument of unravelling 
might apply to our design. The last generation in each OLG game might learn or 
realize that reneging is profitable. Because of backward unravelling, a decline of 
transfers within each OLG game might then be the result. Such a decline might 
become stronger with more experience. In discussing the results we will investi- 
gate whether such a pattern is visible in the data. 
Finally, any design that allows for the possibility of learning or getting 
experience, simultaneously allows for the possibility that reputational considera- 
tions enter the picture. Usually, there is little hope of disentangling these two 
’ And, we believe this is for good reasons. But, as Roth (1995a, p. 80) notes, “this is a question that 
could in principle arise when the predictions of a theory that assumes utility maximization are 
supported by the observed behaviour”. 
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effects. 7 We will not pay too much attention to this matter since the purpose of 
our paper is to study the effect of monitoring as it reveals itself in a comparison 
between treatment I and treatment N. 
3. Design 
Eleven experimental sessions, based on the model described above, were 
conducted on January 9, 10 and 11, 1995. Five sessions employed information 
treatment N (no information) and six sessions employed information treatment I 
(information). Students were recruited from Tilburg University with the announce- 
ment that the experiment would last for about an hour and that they would earn 
anywhere between 7 and 50 Dutch Guilders (i.e., between $4 and $29). No 
subject participated more than once, and most of them had no experience with 
economic experiments. Eight subjects participated in a session. 
Upon arrival, subjects were randomly seated behind computer terminals, which 
were separated by partitions. Instructions were distributed and read aloud (see 
Appendix A). Then subjects were given several minutes to study the instructions 
more carefully and ask questions. One practice round was run before the 15 rounds 
that determined subjects’ earnings. Then, an anonymous questionnaire asked for 
some background information (gender, age, major, motivation). Finally, subjects 
were privately paid their earnings in cash. 
In each session the same pay-off function was used (see Eq. (3)). Each round 
consisted of a sequence of eight periods (O-7). Period 0 is an auxiliary period in 
which the first ‘old’ player was randomly selected from the eight participants. As 
no decisions are made in period 0, it will not enter the analysis. In each subsequent 
period (l-71, one of the remaining subjects was randomly selected to be the young 
player in that period. ’ The young player had to type a number T from the set 
(0, 1, . . . ,7}, which determined his transfer to the old player. First-period con- 
sumption of the young player then was C, = 9 - T. Second-period consumption of 
the old player was C, = 1 + T. The old player was informed about the transfer 
received and her pay-off (in points) in the round: U = C, X Cl. The young player 
became old in the next period and a new young player, randomly chosen from the 
remaining players, had to make a transfer decision. This procedure was repeated 
until period 7. Then all players had participated in the round, and a new round was 
started. After the last round, the points earned in the 15 rounds were added and 
‘Some clues about the relative effects of experience and reputation might be discernible in the data, 
however. For example, learning curves are typically steep in the beginning and become flatter with 
more experience. Effects of learning would then be strongest in the early rounds of the experiment. 
Effects of reputation, on the other hand, would reveal themselves most strongly in the last rounds of the 
experiment, as subjects would then be observed to ‘cash in’ on their reputation. 
* Of course, in the experiment we did not use terms like ‘young’ and ‘old’ generation, but referred 
to these as Decider and Receiver, respectively. 
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converted into money at a rate of 1 point = 5 cents. In addition, each player 
received a lump sum (participation) payment of f 5. All aspects of the procedure 
were common knowledge. 
The two information treatments differed as follows. In treatment N (no informa- 
tion), a player, when selected to enter the round and make a decision, was only 
informed about the period number t E (1, . . . , 7). In treatment I (with information), 
a player was also informed about the transfer decisions made by the players in the 
previous periods of the round (T,, . . . , T,_ , ). Note that in both treatments, a player 
was informed about the transfer made to him and his pay-off (in points) for the 
round when he left the round. 
Some additional remarks have to be made with respect to the procedure. First, 
recall that the player, selected to be old in period 0 of a round, did not play the 
role of the young generation in that round. Her first-period consumption (when 
young) was then fixed at C, = 2. Similarly, the player, selected to be young in the 
last (7th) period of a round, did not play the role of the old generation of that 
round. His second-period consumption was then determined as C, = 1 + T’, where 
T’ is the average transfer received by all previous old players in the round 
(rounded up). All of this was common knowledge. 
Second, to facilitate computation, a pay-off table was included in the instruc- 
tions. Third, in each period (l-6) a player was also asked to type his expectation 
(0, . . . I 7) regarding the transfer to be received from the player in the next period. 
Subjects were not paid to make (accurate) predictions. Therefore, we do not intend 
to make extensive use of these predictions in the analysis. 
Finally, as mentioned earlier, the complexity of the OLG game requires the 
possibility for familiarization and learning by the subjects. In the (sparse) literature 
on OLG experiments, basically two designs can be distinguished. Lim et al. (1994) 
and Marimon and Sunder (1993) use a design that consists of one single, long 
OLG game in which subjects enter several times. Here, one could speak of a 
‘single OLG game with reincarnation’. Cadsby and Frank (1990) use a design that 
consists of a repetition of shorter OLG games, where in each game subjects enter 
only once. Hence, one can speak of ‘repeated OLG games without reincarnation’. 
The advantage of the former design is that an OLG sequence has to be started and 
stopped only once. However, with one long OLG game, the effects of monitoring 
across periods, which is our prime interest, and learning over time become 
intertwined. Discerning the two effects might be served by separating the develop- 
ment of transfers over periods (monitoring) from the development over repetitions 
(learning). Therefore, in our basic design we opted for a repeated OLG game 
without reincarnation. 9 To check for the robustness of the results, however, we 
’ Two differences with the design of Cadsby and Frank are (a) that in our experimental setting eight, 
instead of two, successive generations participated in each OLG game, and (b) that the order in which 
the subjects participated in each OLG game was random in our design but fixed in Cadsby and Frank’s, 
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have also run a series of five experimental sessions with one long OLG game with 
reincarnation (see Section 5). 
4. Results 
First, we will present the results regarding the level, development and stability 
of the transfers for both treatments (Ql). Then we will look more closely at the 
relation between present transfers and previous transfers (Q21. Finally, we discuss 
results regarding end-effects and experience, and we have a look at the individual 
data. 
4.1. Development und variability of transfer levels 
Recall that we have five (six) sessions with treatment N (I), and that in each 
session we have 15 repetitions of an OLG game consisting of 8 periods-genera- 
tions with 7 transfer decisions. The overall average transfer, that is averaged over 
sessions, rounds and periods (l-71, is 1.90 in treatment N (no information) and 
1.83 in treatment I (information). So, at the aggregate level, hardly any difference 
between the information treatments is visible. In fact, the transfer level is 
somewhat lower in treatment I, but the difference is not significant (p = 0.93. 
with a two-tailed Mann - Whitney U test with session averages as observations, 
nN = 5, IZ, = 61. 
The average level of transfers of about 2 might seem low compared with the 
efficient stationary level of T = 4, but in terms of pay-offs the level of efficiency 
is quite high. A stationary level of transfers of T = 4 leads to a pay-off (in periods 
l-7) of 2.5 points. A level of transfers of 7’ = 0 leads to a pay-off of 9 points. The 
actual overall average pay-off (in periods l-7) is 20.5 in treatment N and 20 in 
treatment I. Hence, a stationary transfer level of T = 4 leads to an efficiency gain 
of 16 (= 25-9) points, of which about 11 ( = 20-9) are actually realized in the 
experiment. In other words, the voluntary transfers observed in the experiment 
achieve an overall efficiency level of almost 70%. 
Fig. 1 presents the level of transfers for each round of the OLG game (averaged 
over periods and sessions). For both treatments a two sigma (standard deviation1 
range for the average transfer has been added. It can be seen that the development 
of the average level of transfers over the rounds hardly differs between the two 
treatments. Furthermore, for both treatments, the average transfers seem to de- 
crease in the early rounds (l-5), remain almost constant during the middle rounds 
(6-lo), and decrease again in the final rounds (11-15). The average transfer 
levels in these three subsets of rounds are 2.18, 1.95 and 1.57 for treatment N, and 
2.06, 1.90 and 1.53 for treatment I. The decline over time is statistically signifi- 
cant. That is, for both treatments the average transfers in rounds l-5 are 
significantly larger than in rounds 11-15 (Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank 




- treatment N 
*treatment I 
I 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 I1 12 13 14 15 
round 
Fig. 1. Average transfer by round by treatment plus a two sigma dispersion range. 
tests with session averages as observations). However, for both treatments the 
average transfers in rounds 6-10 are not significantly different from those in 
rounds l-5 and rounds 11-15. Differences between the two treatments are not 
significant in any subset of rounds. 
The sigma ranges provide information about the stability of the voluntary 
transfer system. As argued in Section 2, the possibility of monitoring previous 
generations might affect the stability of the transfers, be it at a high or at a low 
level. If, in treatment I, the early generations start with a low (high) level of 
transfers, then this low (high) level might be followed by subsequent generations. 
No such following pattern is possible in treatment N. However, Fig. 1 shows that 
no systematic difference in the variability exists between the two treatments. 
Furthermore, the dispersion is rather constant over time. 
Fig. 2 presents a histogram of the distribution of the transfers in both treat- 
ments. In both treatments, the modal transfer is zero and transfers of 1 to 4 each 
occur at a rate of about 0.15. Transfers larger than 4 are rare. Although there are 
some differences between the two treatments, the distributions are very similar. 
In summary, no difference in the level, development, distribution or stability of 
the transfers between the two information treatments is detectable in the data. The 
answer to question Ql, whether information facilitates the occurrence of positive 
transfers, is clearly negative. Nevertheless, the average transfer level, of about 
50% of the collectively efficient level, is rather high. Even in later rounds, the 
average transfer is clearly bounded away from zero. 
It might be noted here that our results resemble those of public-good experi- 
ments. In those experiments voluntary contributions to public goods are also 
1’ 
treatment N 
_I treatment I 
transfer 
Fig. 2. Histogram of the transfers in treatments Iv and I 
typically bounded away from zero. This has led to a number of explanations that 
attribute this result to the design of the experiment rather than the motivations of 
the subjects. For example, the typical design, like ours, has the non-cooperative 
equilibrium outcome at the lower bound of the action space. As a consequence, 
any errors would result in positive contributions. Keser (1996), however, uses a 
design in which the non-cooperative outcome is in the interior of the action space. 
Her results indicate that the vast majority of the contributions are above the 
non-cooperative outcome and not symmetric around it. This casts serious doubt on 
the error theory of contributions. Also, it has been argued that 10 to 15 repetitions 
is perhaps not enough for subjects to learn and play the non-cooperative equilib- 
rium. However, Isaac et al. (1994) find that contributions to public goods do not 
approach zero even with 40 to 60 repetitions. They suggest that the decay of the 
contributions is inversely related to the number of repetitions. Hence, increasing 
the number of repetitions is not likely to lead to zero contributions (or transfers). “I 
4.2. A close look at the relationship between present and prellious transfers 
The results of the previous section suggest that we will not find strong 
indications of monitoring across generations. The present section confirms this 
suggestion. 
“’ Also, it has been argued that subjects contribute to public goods because the experimenter expects 
them to do so. To test whether such ‘moral suasion’ (Ledyard, 1995, p. 169) is an important factor, it 
would be interesting to use a ‘double-blind’ procedure, like Hoffman et al. (1994) do in a bargaining 
experiment. We do not know of any public-goods experiments that try a double-blind procedure. 
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Fig. 3. Transfer conditioned upon the previous transfer in the same round in treatment I. 
For treatment I, Fig. 3 displays the average levels of T, as a function of the 
transfer of the previous generation T,_ 1, t 2 2. Values of T,_ I larger than four are 
rare. Therefore, these are pooled with values of four. Furthermore, the results are 
displayed separately for rounds l-5, rounds 6-10 and rounds 11-15 in order to 
control for the decline of the average transfer level over the rounds. Fig. 3 
suggests a weak positive relation between the transfers of the previous and the 
present generation. For instance, the average transfer level after T,_ 1 = 4 + is 
about 50% higher than the transfer level after T,_ , = 0. However, the difference is 
insignificant at p = 0.46 for rounds l-5, p = 0.69 for rounds 6-10 and at 
p = 0.14 for rounds 11-15 (two-tailed Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank test 
with the 6 session averages as observations). In addition, no monotonic positive 
relation between T,_ 1 and T, is observed. For example, the average transfer after 
T,_ , = 2 is lower than after T,_ 1 = 1 in rounds l-5 and round 11-15. Hence, we 
do not find strong signs for the importance of monitoring, rewarding and punish- 
ing. ” 
This conclusion can even be strengthened if we plot a similar figure for 
treatment N (Fig. 4). Note that in treatment N players could not consciously 
establish a relationship between T,_, and T, because T,_, was not known to a 
subject when (s)he decided on T,. Yet, as a comparison with treatment I it is 
” In treatment I, player P, can reward or punish player P,_ 1 for how this player has treated player 
P,_ 2. The final player, P,, might have a somewhat stronger motivation to reward or punish player Ph 
(‘real gift exchange’) as the transfer of P6 not only affects Ps, but also P, himself (because P7 
receives the average of all previous transfers). However, we do not find any sign for this. The relation 
between T, and T,_ 1 is not stronger for P, than for the earlier players, P, to Ph. 
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Fig. 4. Transfer conditioned upon the previous transfer in the same round in treatment N 
interesting to display this relationship for treatment N, too. Fig. 4 suggests a weak 
positive relation between present and previous transfer for treatment N, which is of 
similar magnitude as the one for treatment I. For treatment N, this weak positive 
relationship between T,_ 1 and T, can be explained by the gradual decline of the 
transfers across rounds. Since this decline also plays a role in treatment I, it casts 
doubt on the importance of monitoring as an explanation for the (already weak) 
positive relation observed in Fig. 3. 
Figs. 3 and 4 suggest, moreover, that the relationship between T,_ , and T, does 
not change over time. A more detailed picture of the development of this relation 
over time can be obtained if we plot the correlation coefficient between T,_ , and 
T, in each round. Fig. 5 displays the development of the correlation coefficients 
for both treatments. The figure shows that the correlation coefficient is about equal 
in both treatments and that there is no strong, systematic change across the rounds. 
This picture can be confirmed statistically using Mann-Whitney and Wilcoxon 
tests for subsets of rounds, respectively. Hence, there are weak signs of punishing 
and rewarding, but the effect is not strongly ‘intrinsic’ (it is weak in the early 
rounds), nor is it ‘learned’ during the experiment (it remains weak in the final 
rounds). 
One might argue that a monotonic relation between T,_ , and T, is not what we 
should be looking for. If subjects are more strategically motivated, we should 
expect to observe ‘trigger-like strategies’. As argued in Section 2, trigger strate- 
gies suggest that present transfers must be conditioned on the transfers of all 
previous generations. No version of trigger-like strategies is visible in the data, 
however. The average transfer in case there should be a punishment is not 
distinguishable from the transfer in case there should be no punishment. 
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Fig. 5. The correlation coefficient between the transfer and the previous transfer by treatment. 
We also tested the confidence-building approach discussed in Section 2 (Eq. 
(5)). A result that is in line with this approach is that, on average, transfers levels 
T, are lower in case the previous player has decreased the transfer level CT,_, < 
T,_ 2), than in case she has not decreased the transfer level CT,_ 1 2 Z’_2). The 
average transfer in the former case (1.68) is significantly lower than the average 
transfer in the latter case (1.81). The effect, though significant, is small and shows 
no strong development over time. 
In summary, as could be expected in view of the negative answer to question 
Ql in the previous section, only a moderate relation between present and previous 
transfer levels is found in the data of treatment I (and of treatment N). Moreover, 
this relation seems to become neither stronger nor weaker with more experience. l2 
I2 In the experiment we also asked subjects’ expectations about the transfer of the next generation 
(see Section 3). Two relationships could be interesting here. Firstly, the relationship between one’s own 
transfer and the expected transfer (as a measure for anticipated rewarding or punishing), and, secondly, 
the relationship between the expected transfer and the actually received transfer (as a measure for the 
accuracy of the expectation). Overall, it appears that the first (corhelation is stronger for treatment N 
(0.57) than for treatment I (0.41). Hence, rewards and punishments are anticipated more strongly if, by 
construction, they cannot be provided. What is more interesting, perhaps, is that this (cor)relation 
shows no systematic development over the rounds, that is, it becomes neither stronger nor weaker. The 
second relation is very weak (a correlation coefficient of about 0.10) in both treatments. Hence. 
subjects seem to be bad predictors. Again, the correlation shows no systematic development over the 
rounds. As subjects were not rewarded for making (accurate) predictions we do not wish to put much 
weight on these results, however. 
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4.3. End effects, experience and individual data 
As argued before, in addition to the transfers of previous generations in the 
round, several other factors may affect the level of transfers and its development 
over time. In this subsection we briefly analyze end effects, experience, and look 
at individual data. 
First, our design consists of a repetition of finite OLG games. Subjects who 
enter an OLG game in the last period, know that they are last in the sequence of 
that round. Hence, backward-induction reasoning might induce them to renege on 
any (implicitly agreed upon) positive transfer level by previous generations. 
Moreover, due to the backward induction unravelling argument, we might expect 
to observe a gradual decline of the transfer level over the periods in each round of 
the OLG game. 
A weak final period end effect is indeed visible in the data. For both treatments, 
Fig. 6 presents the level of transfers for each period of the OLG game (averaged 
over rounds) and the dispersion, given by a two sigma range. The average transfer 
level in period 7 is somewhat smaller than the average level over periods l-h. 
When considering both treatments together, the difference is marginally significant 
(Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank tests, p < O.lO), but it is not significant 
when each treatment is taken separately. Furthermore, no monotonic development 




Fig. 6. Average transfer by period by treatment plus a IWO sigma dispersion range. 
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Fig. 7. Average transfer as a function of the transfer received in the previous round (both treatments). 
in the OLG game transfer a comparable amount of their endowment. l3 Moreover, 
the variability of the transfers does not seem to depend on the number of the 
period. 
Second, it is to be expected that subjects adapt their behaviour in response to 
their experience in the previous round(s) of the experiment. A representative 
picture of the size of the effect of experience is given in Fig. 7, which combines 
both treatments. Average transfer levels in round R (= 2, . . . ,15) are related to 
the transfer level received in the previous round (R - 1). The figure shows that, 
on average, subjects tend to give a somewhat higher transfer if they have been 
‘treated well’ in the previous round. To control for the gradual decline of the 
transfer level over rounds (see Fig. 1) the effect is displayed separately for early 
(2-5), middle (6-10) and later rounds (11-15). This separation shows that the 
effect is not substantially different in earlier or later rounds. A weak positive 
relation can be observed, but it becomes neither stronger nor weaker over time. l4 
Until now we have mainly focused on aggregated data. A look at the individual 
data, however, reveals that some 28 subjects followed an almost constant strategy. 
That is, in each round, they chose about the same transfer level, irrespective of 
period, round or history. Twelve of these players could be characterized as ‘strict 
I3 No clear development across rounds can be observed. The end effect becomes neither stronger nor 
weaker with experience. 
l4 Comparing the average transfer after having received 0 in the previous round, with the average 
transfer after having received 4, gives no significant difference for rounds 2-5 or rounds 11-15, when 
taking the two treatments together (Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank test with 11 observations). 
Taking the treatments separately, gives a significant effect only for treatment N in rounds 2-5. 
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gamesmen’ (6 in treatment I and 6 in treatment Nl. They chose a transfer of zero 
in each round, with at most three exceptions. Ten subjects could be labelled 
‘altruists’ (4 in treatment I and 6 in treatment Nl. They transferred at least three in 
each round, with at most three exceptions. Another 6 subjects chose an almost 
constant transfer level in between 0 and 4. The presence of these 28 subjects with 
an almost constant transfer, could blur the (quantitative) effects of monitoring, 
end-effects, or learning. Therefore, we have repeated all previous analyses for the 
subset of 60 (= 88-28) players with a non-constant strategy. The overall conclu- 
sions, however, hardly change. Some of the above effects become quantitatively 
stronger, but the differences with the full-group analysis are remarkably small. 
Besides the 28 subjects who followed an almost constant strategy of giving, we 
(only) found 13 subjects who were strongly and systematically affected by the 
immediate history of play. In particular, we found 7 subjects who clearly followed 
the transfer of the previous player in the round. These ‘followers’ are character- 
ized by a high and significant positive correlation between their own transfer and 
the transfer of the previous player in the round (all these subjects are in treatment 
I). In addition, 6 subjects could be identified who reacted strongly on the transfer 
received in the previous round. They are characterized by a high and significant 
positive correlation between their present transfer and the transfer received in the 
previous round. For example, two subjects consistently chose a transfer that was 
somewhat lower than the one received in the previous round. Apart from these 13 
subjects, we were unable to find other subjects who seemed to react to the 
previous transfer in any consistent or systematic manner. Hence, this analysis of 
the individual data more or less confirms the previous aggregate data analysis 
There are weak signs for a positive relation between present and previous transfers 
(for some subjects), but surely this is not a main factor for explaining the observed 
transfer levels. 
Finally, it would seem useful to have some overall picture of the relative effects 
of the various factors, analyzed separately above. The simplest way to give such a 
picture is to regress transfer levels on these multiple factors. In particular, we ran 
OLS-regressions of the following behavioural equation: I5 
The equation reads as follows. A subject’s transfer T,’ in period t ( = 1. ,71 is 
hypothesized to depend on a constant (a,), the round number CR), the transfer of 
the previous generation in the round CT,!? r), the difference of the transfers of the 
I5 Implicitly, the regression assumes that observations are independent, which is not the case, strictly 
speaking. Regressions using individual decisions are rather common in experimental research, though. 
particularly for ‘illustrative’ purposes. 
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Table 1 
Regression of the behavioural equations for the two treatments 
Treatment N Treatment I 
Value p-value Value p-value 
%I 0.92 0.01 1.17 0.00 
R -0.01 0.47 -0.01 0.68 
T,R I 0.15 0.02 
T,! , - T,! 2 - 0.06 0.19 
t - 0.05 0.32 - 0.09 0.09 
RR- I 0.20 0.00 0.03 0.58 
TR- 1 0.48 0.00 0.38 0.00 
# obs. 350 420 
P 0.30 0.17 
previous two generations in the round (T,! i-T,! 2), the period number (t), the 
transfer received in the previous round (RR- ‘>, the transfer given in the previous 
round (TR- ‘> and an error term (7). In sequence, these are the factors analyzed 
separately above. 
Table 1 presents the regression results, for each treatment separately. The 
exogenous variables are in the first column. Parameter estimates and correspond- 
ing significance levels of the t-statistic are in the next two columns. ” In 
treatment N, T,! 1 and Z’,!, - T,R2 have not been included, as this information 
was not available to the subjects. The monitoring possibility appears to result in 
some actions on the basis of the transfer by the previous player: in treatment I, 
T,! , has a significantly positive effect, although its quantitative effect is small. On 
the other hand, we do not find any indication for the existence of a confidence 
parameter as suggested by Eq. (5); the estimated coefficient of variable T,!! 1 - T,! z 
is insignificant. In treatment N, owing to the lack of information, decisions are 
mainly based on the transfer received in the previous round (RR- ‘) and the 
transfer given in the previous round (TR- ’ >, the latter indicating some presence of 
personal inertia or idiosyncrasy. The latter variable has also a significant effect 
under treatment I, whereas the former has no effect. 
Concluding, the regression results show some small impact of monitoring and 
some presence of rewards and punishments. However, in line with our findings in 
the foregoing analysis, the effects seem to be very small. On average, subjects 
seem to balance the trade-off between the collective efficiency of a transfer 
scheme and the individual temptation to defect on such a scheme somewhere 
‘halfway’, with marginal adjustments in response to personal experience. 
l6 Because of the regression specification, only the results in periods 3 to 7 of rounds 2 to 15 can be 
used. 
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5. Two additional designs 
To check on the robustness of the results, we ran two additional sets of 
experiments with information treatment I (in March 1995, with eight inexperi- 
enced subjects in each of the nine sessions). As these additional experiments 
confirm the picture presented in the previous section, we do not dwell on them 
extensively. 
First, the results described above might be sensitive to our choice for a 
‘repeated OLG game without reincarnation’. Therefore, we had five additional 
experimental sessions with ‘one long OLG game with reincarnation’. These 
experimental sessions consisted of one OLG game of 120 ( = 15 X 81 periods. In 
this design, the OLG sequence has to be started and finished only once. The young 
player entering in each period was determined randomly with two restrictions 
(about which the subjects were informed). First, each subject would enter the 
game fifteen times, and, second, a player who entered in a particular period could 
not enter in the next two periods. Furthermore, in line with information treatment 
I, a player entering a period was informed about the transfer levels in the 
preceding eight periods. 
The results show that the average transfer level in this design (1.38) is lower 
than in our basic design (1.83). The difference, however, is not significant 
(Mann-Whitney U test with session averages as observations). Also in other 
respects the results are similar. For example, in each session the transfer level is 
relatively volatile, there is a slow decline with experience, and there are only weak 
signs of rewarding and punishing. 
A second worry we had regarding our design, was that the strategy space was 
‘too large’ to employ trigger-like strategies. The more options a player has, the 
more difficult it will be to coordinate on any implicit social contract. For example. 
subjects might not agree on the transfer level aimed at by a contract. Similarly, it 
might be unclear whether transfer levels of, say, 2 should also be punished or that 
punishment should only occur with levels of 0 and 1. To simplify the development 
and employment of trigger strategies in support of a social contract, we carried out 
four additional sessions (treatment I) with transfer levels restricted to the set {0,4} 
instead of (0, 1, . ,7}. This design, in a sense, solves the coordination problem 
for the subjects. If an implicit contract aims at a positive transfer level, it is clear 
what this level should be. Moreover, defining defection is much easier. 
It turns out that the restriction of the strategy space results in lower average 
transfer levels (1.04) than in treatment I of the basic design (1.83). The difference 
is significant at the 5% level (two-tailed U test with session averages as observa- 
tions). Moreover, there is no indication of any increased success or even an 
attempt to use trigger-like strategies. Under trigger strategies, the least we should 
expect is that the average transfer in case there should be a punishment is smaller 
than the transfer in case there should be no punishment. However, we do not find 
a significant difference. On the contrary, the weakly positive relation between T( 
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and T,_ 1 displayed in Fig. 3, becomes even weaker. Average transfers in response 
to T,_ 1 = 0 (1.04) are almost identical to average transfers in response to T,_ 1 = 4 
(1.02). What the restriction of the transfer set seems to do, is to make it more 
difficult for subjects to balance the trade-off between individual and collective 
rationality. On average, subjects seem to make a balance at a value of about 2, but 
restricting the choice to 0 or 4, seems to tip the balance downward. 
In summary, the additional series of experiments confirms the general picture 
of our baseline design. Although average transfer levels are somewhat lower, they 
are still clearly bounded away from zero. More importantly, the absence of strong 
signs of rewards and punishments or trigger strategies in our baseline design is not 
due to ‘repetition of an OLG game without reincarnation’ or due to the ‘large 
strategy set’. 
6. Conclusion 
We started our paper with the observation that, in spite of the financial strain, 
the support for public pension systems does not seem to decrease strongly. This 
raises the question of the basic motivation and the driving force behind the 
establishment and maintenance of intergenerational transfer systems. Theoretical 
explanations suggested that there is a strong positive link between the decisions of 
past, present and future generations. The incentive of the present generation to 
renege, can be mitigated by the possibility of the next generation to monitor the 
adherence to the scheme and to reward or punish accordingly. 
The main result of our experiments is that the level and stability of the transfer 
system is not furthered by the possibility of monitoring transfers of past genera- 
tions. Furthermore, only weak signs of rewards and punishments or trigger-like 
strategies are found. There appears to be almost no (corhelation between the 
transfers of present and past generations. Notions like reward and punishment 
hardly seem to play a role. Yet, substantial levels of voluntary transfers can be 
observed in the experiment. Subjects seem responsive to the trade-off between the 
collective interest of a transfer scheme and the individual temptation to defect on 
such a scheme. On average, subjects seem to balance the trade-off somewhere 
about ‘half-way’, with marginal adjustments in response to personal experience. 
It is interesting to relate these results to the typical results of both bargaining 
experiments and public-goods experiments. Although public-goods experiments 
lack the intertemporal structure that characterizes our experiment, there also, the 
typical result is that subjects balance the trade-off between individual and collec- 
tive rationality somewhere halfway. With repetition and experience, contribution 
rates fall, but usually they stay bounded away from zero. In bargaining experi- 
ments, a general finding is that the power of the receiving side is a prime 
determinant of the ‘generosity’ of the proposing side. In bilateral relationships, the 
possibility of monitoring and reciprocating is an important check on the power of 
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the proposer. Our results, on the other hand, do not show a strong impact of 
monitoring. 
This would suggest that in the OLG experiment the public-good feature may be 
more important than the intertemporal bargaining feature. It would seem that the 
interdependence in the underlying OLG structure creates a kind of social cohesion 
which is independent of the possibility of monitoring. The average individual 
appears to have a generic, though moderate willingness to support transfers, which 
is almost irrespective of the past behaviour of the recipient. Notions like monitor- 
ing, rewarding and punishing hardly seem to play a role. If a norm is at work, it 
must be one which does not necessarily depend on a monitoring possibility. One 
such norm that is more in line with our results is the notion of (anticipated) 
reciprocity, advanced by Sugden (1984) to explain voluntary contributions to 
public goods. Contrary to the more traditional notion of reciprocity as a kind of 
quid pro quo (Gouldner, 1960) Sugden’s norm of reciprocity entails that you 
contribute to a collective good to the extent that you anticipate others to contribute 
(not to the extent that you observe others to contribute). Adherence to this norm of 
anticipated reciprocity does not presuppose a monitoring possibility. In this sense, 
it is in line with our finding that monitoring does not effect the level of voluntary 
transfers. 
A natural question to ask is to what extent the results of the experiment are 
likely to generalize to the wider world. A good reason to maintain some healthy 
scepticism is that we do not know to what extent the motivations and attitudes of 
the subjects in the experiment correspond to those of the individuals in the field of 
substantive interest. Consequently, some of the phenomena that we observe in the 
laboratory may have diminished importance in the field, and phenomena that have 
no opportunity to emerge in the laboratory may assume more importance (Roth, 
1995b, p. 329). For example, it is possible that we observe voluntary transfers in 
the lab due to a norm (e.g., anticipated reciprocity), that plays no role in the field. 
On the other hand, the popular support for pension schemes in the field may rest 
on an attitude (e.g., intergenerational altruism) that we did not induce on the 
laboratory subjects. Therefore, it is necessary to “generalize with caution” (Holt, 
1995, p. 424). Generalizibility (sometimes called external validity or parallelism) 
is not an a self-evident axiom or a matter that can be resolved theoretically. 
Ultimately, of course, it is an empirical issue. I7 
Of some interest in this respect, are the results of a large-scale survey in the 
Netherlands (Van der Heijden et al., 1995), which indicate that people in general 
have a very poor knowledge of the (unfavourable) relation between the present 
” Fortunately, there is some cause for optimism in this respect. For example, in a clever experiment. 
Erev et al. (1993) successfully generalized their laboratory results (on the effects of intergroup 
competition on free riding) to a field setting. Furthermore, many results obtained with the typical 
student subjects, have been replicated with populations of more substantive interest (see, e.g.. DeJong 
et al., 1988; Mestelman and Feeny, 1988; Dyer et al., 1989). 
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costs and future benefits of the current public pension scheme. In spite of that (or, 
perhaps, because of that) the same respondents expressed a strong willingness to 
support the current pension scheme. This result is in line with our main experimen- 
tal result that the support for a transfer scheme does not depend much on 
monitoring. In a loose sense, one could say that in both the experiment and the 
survey, the private insurance element of transfers (‘bargaining frame’) seems less 
important than the collective public-good element in the transfer system. 
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Appendix A. Instructions 
A.1. Introduction (read aloud only) 
You are about to participate in an experimental study of decision-making. The 
experiment will last for about one hour. The instructions of the experiment are 
simple and if you follow them carefully and make good decisions you may earn a 
considerable amount of money. All the money you earn will be yours to keep and 
will be paid to you, privately and confidentially, in cash right after the end of the 
experiment 
{For the experiment it is of crucial importance to have 8 participants. However, 
experience shows that often 1 or 2 persons do not show up or do not show up in 
time. Therefore, we need to have 10 instead of 8 subscriptions. This sometimes 
has, as now, the consequence that too many participants are present and that 1 or 2 
persons cannot participate in this experiment. These persons can still put their 
name down for one of the following experiments and receive f 10 for any 
inconvenience. These persons are determined by lot because one or two blank 
envelopes are added to the box with seating numbers, unless one of you checks in 
voluntarily not to participate in the experiment and receive f 10 instead.) 
Before we go on with the instructions, I would like to ask all of you to draw an 
envelope from this box and open it. The number denotes the terminal you have to 
be seated. {If you draw a blank envelope you cannot participate in the experiment 
and you receive f 10.) 
We will distribute the instructions of the experiment now and read through 
them together. After that, you will have the opportunity to ask questions. From 
1386 E.C.M. cun der Heijden et ul. /European Economic Review 42 (1998) 1363-l.?Yl 
now on, you are requested not to talk to, or communicate with, any other 
participant. 
Instructions (distributed and read aloud) ” 
A.2. Decisions and earnings 
The experiment exists of fifteen separate rounds. In every round, each of you 
will earn a certain amount of points. At the end of the experiment the points 
earned in the 15 rounds are added up for each participant separately. Every point 
earned is worth 5 cent (= $0.028) at the end of the experiment. In addition to 
this, all participants receive a fixed extra amount of f 5. Your total earnings will 
thus be equal to f 5 plus the number of points earned times 5 cent. Now, we 
describe how the points earned in each round will be determined. 
Each round will consist of seven periods. In every period two participants are 
involved, a so-called Decider and a Receiuer. In each round of seven periods, 
every participant will, in principle, once have the role of Decider and once the role 
of Receiver. The earnings of a participant in a round are determined by the final 
assets of a participant in the period in which he or she is a Decider, and by the 
final assets of the participant in the period in which he or she is a Receiver. We 
denote the final assets as Receiver by E, and the final assets as Decider by E,. 
The earnings in points of a participant in a round are determined by the product of 
the final assets as Receiver and the final assets as Decider. The earnings of a 
participant in a round are thus equal to E, X E, points. Next, we describe how the 
final assets as Decider E, and the final assets as Receiver E, are determined. 
In the first period of a particular round, two participants are randomly assigned 
by the computer to be Receiver and Decider. The Receiver starts with an 
endowment of 1, whereas the Decider starts with and endowment of 9. The 
Decider has to decide which part of his or her endowment that he or she wants to 
transfer to the Receiver. This transfer, which we will denote by T, is 0 at the 
minimum, and 7 at the maximum. After the Decider has decided about the transfer 
T to the Receiver, the final assets of the Receiver are E,, = 1 + T, and those of the 
Decider are E, = 9 - T. After the Decider has decided about her or his transfer to 
the Receiver, the next period of the round will be started. The participant who was 
the Receiver in the previous round is finished for this round. 
In the next period, the Decider of the previous period will now be the Receiver. 
The new Decider is selected by the computer from the participants who have not 
yet taken turns in this round. The determination of the final assets of the new 
‘s The text between square brackets ([I) was added in treatment 1. The text between braces (0) wab 
added when more than 8 participants showed up. 
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Receiver and Decider in this period is similar to the previous period. The Receiver 
starts with an endowment of 1 and the Decider starts with an endowment of 9. The 
Decider decides again about the part of her or his endowment that will be 
transferred to the Receiver. This transfer T determines the final assets of both 
participants: E, = 1 + T for the Receiver and E, = 9 - T for the Decider. 
Subsequently, a new period will be started in which the old Decider becomes 
the new Receiver and the new Decider is selected from the participants who have 
not yet taken turns. In this way, we continue up to and including the seventh 
period. After that, the next round of seven periods will be started. 
Note that the participant who is Receiver in the first period of a round will not 
take a turn as Decider in that particular round. For this participant the final assets 
as Decider are determined to be E, = 2. Further, the participant who is Decider in 
the seventh period of a round will not take a turn as Receiver in that round. For 
this participant the final assets as Receiver E, will be equal to the average final 
assets of all seven Receivers in that particular round, so including the current 
Receiver. 
As said, your earnings in a round are determined by the product of your final 
assets E, in your role of Decider and the final assets E, in your role of Receiver. 
Your assets E, are dependent on your transfer to the Receiver in the period you 
are Decider and your assets E, are dependent on the transfer from the Decider to 
you in the period you are Receiver. To facilitate the determination of your 
earnings, you may use the table below. 
The table states your earnings in points in a round dependent on the transfer 
from you to the Receiver when you are Decider and the transfer to you by the 
Decider when you are Receiver. In this table the rows present the transfer from 
you as Decider to the Receiver and the columns present the transfer to you as 
Receiver from the Decider. When you first look for the transfer from you in the 
row and then go to the right to the column stating the transfer to you, you can read 
your earnings in points, E, X E,, for the round. The earnings in money are 
determined by multiplying the stated amount in points by 5 cents. 
Transfer to you from the Decider when you are 
Receiver 
01 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Transfer from you 0 9 18 27 36 45 54 63 72 
to the Receiver 1 8 16 24 32 40 48 56 64 
when you are 2 7 14 21 28 35 42 49 56 
Decider 3 6 12 18 24 30 36 42 48 
4 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 
5 4 8 12 16 20 24 28 32 
6 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24 
7 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 
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When you are the first Receiver in a round, your final assets as Decider are 
determined to be E, = 2. In that case, your earnings in points, E, X E,. only 
depend on the transfer from the Decider to you E, = 1 + T. You can read these 
earnings from the table by looking for the column with the concerning transfer to 
you in the bottommost row (with transfer from you is 7). 
When you are the last (seventh) Decider in a round, your final assets ax 
Receiver E, are determined as the average final assets of all seven Receivers in 
that round (rounded up). Your earnings in points, E, X EO, are determined via the 
table by the row with the transfer from you and the column of which the number 
equals the average transfer to all Receivers in that round. 
A.3. Procedure and usage of the computer 
After we have gone through the instructions, first a practice round will be run. 
After the practice round, the fifteen rounds that determine your earnings for this 
experiment will be run. 
In every round the computer, in a completely random manner, determines who 
will get the roles of Receiver and Decider in the first period. On the screen the 
Receiver will see the message “You are the first Receiver”. The Decider will see 
the number of the current period on the upper left part of the screen. [Next to it, 
you will see “INFORMATION until now”. In the first period this information 
will only consist of the message “There have been no previous periods in this 
round”]. Underneath, the Decider will see the question “How much of your 
endowment do you transfer (O--71?” The Decider has to type an integer from 0 up 
to and including 7. The number typed is the transfer 7’ to the current Receiver. 
Next, the current Decider will be asked the question “How much do you 
expect to receive?“. Here, the Decider types an integer from 0 up to and including 
7, dependent on her or his expectation about the transfer she or he expects to 
receive as Receiver in the next period. This expectation is used by us when 
analyzing the experiment, but your earnings will be unaffected by it. Besides, the 
other participants are not informed about your expectations stated. 
After the Decider has taken her or his Decision, the current Receiver will see 
the number of the present period on the screen and underneath how much she or 
he receives and her or his earnings for the round. After the Receiver has taken note 
of this, he or she has to press Return to close the current period and to start the 
new one. 
The Decider of the previous period becomes Receiver in the new period and the 
computer will select a new Decider from the participants who have not yet taken 
turns in this round. This new Decider sees the number of the current period on the 
upper left part of the screen [and next to it “INFORMATION until now”. 
Underneath, it is reported for every decider of the previous periods how much he 
or she has transferred, how much he or she has received as Receiver and what her 
or his earnings are for the round. For the Decider of the previous period it is only 
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shown how much he or she has transferred because this Decider is Receiver in the 
current period] and underneath the question “How much of your endowment do 
you transfer (O-7)?” After this decision has been typed and passed on to the 
current Receiver a new period will be started in which the Decider of the previous 
period will be the new Receiver. This procedure will be repeated up to and 
including period 7. 
In all periods, a new Decider is randomly selected by the computer from all 
participants who have not yet taken turns in that round. After all seven periods in a 
round have been completed, the first period of the next round is started. Then, a 
new Receiver and Decider are again randomly selected by the computer for the 
first period and time after time a new Decider for the next periods is selected. 
Therefore, the order in which the participants take turns in every round is not fixed 
but is determined time after time by the computer in a random way. You cannot 
know when it will be your turn in a round. Moreover, you cannot know to whom 
you will be paired in a certain period. 
A.4. Summary 
The experiment consists of 15 rounds, and every round consists of 7 periods. In 
every period, two participants are involved, a Receiver and a Decider. The 
endowment of the Receiver is 1 and the endowment of the Decider is 9. The final 
assets of Receiver and Decider are dependent on the transfer T of the Decider to 
the Receiver: E, = 1 + T, E, = 9 - T. In every round, in principle, you are the 
Decider in one period, and the Receiver in the next period. Your earnings in points 
in a round are determined by the product of your final assets in the period you are 
Decider and your final assets in the period you are Receiver: E, X E,. 
The participant who is Receiver in the first period will not act as a Decider in 
that round. His or her final assets as Decider are determined to be E, = 2. The 
participant who is Decider in the last period will not act as a Receiver in that 
round. His or her finals assets as Receiver E, are determined as the average final 
assets of all seven Receivers of that round, so including the current Receiver. 
In every period, only the current Decider and Receiver are informed about the 
size of the transfer given from the Decider to the Receiver. [instead of the previous 
line in information condition 2: In every period the current Decider receives 
information about the transfer of the deciders in the previous periods.] 
The order in which the participants participate in the periods of a certain round 
is determined by the computer in a completely random way time after time. You 
will never be able to know when it will be your turn in a round or to whom you 
will be paired in a certain period. 
AS. Final remarks 
After the last round, you will first be requested to answer some questions to 
evaluate the experiment. This questionnaire is anonymous. We can link your 
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answers to your seat number but not to your name. After that, you will be called 
by your seat number to receive your earnings privately and confidentially. Your 
earnings are your own business; you do not need to discuss with anyone. It is not 
allowed to talk to or communicate with other participants during the experiment in 
either way. 
On your table you will find an empty sheet, which you can use to take notes. 
Additionally, you will find a sheet labelled ‘REMARKS’. On this sheet you can 
make remarks about the instructions or your decisions. 
You get a couple of minutes to go through the instructions and to ask questions. 
When you want to ask something, please raise your hand. One of us will come to 
your table to speak to you. 
After that we will start the practice round. 
Are there any questions? 
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